In the final months of World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the potential for the wartime R&D boom to benefit society. He wrote to Vannevar Bush — then the Director of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development[1] — asking him to investigate how the U.S. Government could continue to reap the benefits of scientific research once the war ended. Bush responded to Roosevelt’s request with a report entitled Science: the Endless Frontier, which laid out, among other proposals, a vision of a government-funded, scientist-run agency that would institutionalize government support for scientific research.[2]
The report ultimately catalyzed executive and legislative branch efforts to promote and fund basic scientific research in peacetime, diffuse the benefits of existing developments, and cultivate new scientific talent.[3] Endless Frontier also capitalized on a United States that was emerging from an era where (1) the U.S. Government held a strong role in funding the majority of the nation’s leading research and development (R&D),[4] and (2) actors in the ecosystem had the same broad goal as the federal government — to win the war — an ethos that resulted in the establishment of the Manhattan Project.[5] Together, those dynamics resulted in an innovation ecosystem aligned with national strategic interests. Still today, the ripple effects of Bush’s Endless Frontier can be felt through the many technological innovations that grew from the research the federal government has funded.[6]
To ensure U.S. leadership in critical technology innovation, it is worth revisiting the goals of Bush’s original postwar agenda: continuing scientific development, funding quicker and more effective R&D, cultivating the talent pool, and ensuring the diffusion of technology to bring benefits to the American people — while also addressing the broader challenge of bridging the innovation ecosystem with national strategic interests. We must also appreciate the fundamental shifts that have taken place since Bush’s era:
- Science and technology have grown in complexity and scale, expanding the scope of innovation. Innovation today is occurring at the intersection of atoms, bits, and cells as multiple general-purpose technologies emerge and converge. The industry-driven digital innovation of the Internet era and the deep, incremental research conducted in academic labs will be insufficient on their own. Technological convergence on such a scale will require systematic cross-disciplinary mechanisms to turn inventions into applications.
- The People’s Republic of China has emerged as our chief strategic rival, making the implications of competition more consequential. The PRC is much more integrated into the global economy than the isolated and closed-off Soviet Union (USSR) of the 1950s. The PRC is a formidable competitor in science and technology, drawing on its sprawling industrial manufacturing base, government-directed resources, and unfair international economic practices. Although its centrally planned, top-down government structure resembles the USSR’s, the PRC system is more agile and adaptive to the changing pace of innovation. As Beijing doubles down on its attempts to achieve technological self-reliance, it is indeed taking cues from Vannevar Bush on how to position a nation to lead the way to the Endless Frontier.[7]
- The center of gravity within the American innovation ecosystem has shifted. Compared to the post-WWII era, innovation in the United States today is no longer confined to or being led primarily by government labs. Today, American innovation thrives everywhere — garages, workshops, even makeshift labs — and Bush’s original “triangle of innovation” of government, academia, and industry has since taken on a “new geometry” with the emergence of new stakeholders and incentive structures.[8] At the same time, investment in innovation remains concentrated in specific geographical, institutional, and even technological areas, leaving gaps.[9] Industry alone cannot bridge these gaps, especially in “deep tech” sectors like biotechnology and clean energy — sectors that often require massive upfront costs, long-term investment, and a willingness to take big risks.[10]
In his letter to Bush, Roosevelt noted, “New frontiers of the mind are before us, and if they are pioneered with the same vision, boldness, and drive with which we have waged this war we can create a fuller and more fruitful employment and a fuller and more fruitful life.”[11] His words were no truer then than they are now — 80 years later — especially in light of Artificial Intelligence (AI).
Four Ways to Create the Necessary Conditions for Innovation Power
In the pursuit of a future where technological innovation continues to drive progress and prosperity, America must embrace a comprehensive strategy that empowers its people, institutions, and industries. This requires a renewed commitment to executing national programs for U.S. leadership, implementing agile funding mechanisms for research and development, building strong public-private partnerships that transcend silos, and equipping the government with the tools to address the challenges of the digital age.[12] By prioritizing the following four interconnected objectives, America can unleash its full innovation potential, ensuring that groundbreaking discoveries are translated into real-world solutions that benefit all of humanity.
Technology strategy will carry little geopolitical weight unless it is translated into actual fielded technology capabilities. National programs can turn our competitive advantages into positions of advantage in the technologies that matter.[13] The United States has a history of setting and meeting audacious national technology ambitions when the moment demands it. The Manhattan Project, Apollo Program, and Operation Warp Speed exemplify America’s ability to harness the collective strength of our innovation ecosystem toward national ends. A “moonshot mindset” for each technology battleground is critical for U.S. leadership in the age of innovation power.
The goal for a national program or a “moonshot” should be high, pushing past incremental technical progress and instead shifting the boundaries of what is scientifically possible and creating new paradigms. For a moonshot to effectively translate competitive advantages into technical leadership and, ultimately, innovation power, it requires a whole-of-ecosystem effort. This effort should be overseen by dedicated leaders — a National Mission Manager — who is accountable for the program’s success. While the correct number and type of national programs are determined through technology and competitive strategy arguments, all moonshots require resources, accountability, and resolve to see their ambitions through.[14]
To maintain its edge, the United States needs renewed and expanded investments at every stage of technological development, from basic research all the way to commercialization.The current funding landscape where the government primarily supports fundamental research to prove technological concepts and private capital offers seed and series funding is not optimized to support the next generation of technologies that increasingly require sustained and substantial amounts of resources to reach commercial scale.[15] Additionally, the timeline and rigidity of the federal budget process does not always match the rate of technological change and the objectives of private investors do not always align with the nation’s strategic needs.[16] To translate scientific breakthroughs into real innovation power, the United States must develop versatile investment mechanisms to propel strategic technology development, transcend traditional funding cycles, and bridge public and private investment timelines.[17]
The United States must first set the foundation for innovation by increasing its federal investments in research and development (R&D) to one percent of GDP by 2030.[18] Increased federal investment for R&D should emphasize non-defense AI and support critical AI research infrastructure like the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR) as artificial intelligence rapidly accelerates scientific discovery and tech development.[19] Federal investment mechanisms should also be expanded to support first-of-a-kind technologies, moving scientific ideas closer to functioning prototypes by utilizing the government’s ability to become a technology’s “first buyer” or “guaranteed customer” which derisks private investments and creates market demand.[20] Lastly, the United States should build upon federal resourcing and align the entire capital stack with national needs through a public-private fund to increase flexibility and balance when channeling investments toward technology development. Through different and expanding funding mechanisms, the United States can keep pace with the rapid technological change occurring today and secure the ability to create the innovations of tomorrow.
The failures of the pre-WWII era and the demands of the postwar era in Vannevar Bush’s time necessitated the creation of a National Security Council. The techno-economic competition underway today demands a bold institutional response. This includes a set of new organizations that work across the innovation ecosystem to conduct horizon scanning and critical technology assessments, set national technology ambitions, and coordinate their implementation. At the national level, as SCSP has previously recommended, these essential functions could be fulfilled by a Technology Competitiveness Council (TCC), an Office for Global Competition Analysis (OCA), and a United States Advanced Technology Forum (USATF).[21] Together, these entities would provide the institutional scaffolding to harness the diversity and complexity of the 21st-century innovation ecosystem to achieve national ends.
At the subnational level, every region, state, and city can tap into its own unique form of innovation power, amplifying the impact of the federal government’s investments in tech hubs.[22] Across the nation, regional innovation is driven by clusters of community colleges, universities, national laboratories, regional incubators and accelerators, local capital firms, philanthropies, and engaged citizenry, with the support of multiple levels of government.[23] Harnessing this innovation capacity across the nation will require creating connections across the institutions or nodes, resulting in a “nucleated” ecosystem that supports growth and tech development.[24] Bolstering support for NSF’s Directorate for Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships and EDA would continue to catalyze the creation of these connections across the nation.[25] At a regional level, such bridges can take the form of novel public-private partnerships and organizations that foster interactions between academia, government, industry, and private capital.[26] Exemplar bridging organizations like Engine Ventures in Boston and Capital Factory in Austin are already demonstrating how local tech-focused venture funds can help catalyze regional innovation.[27]
Under the breakneck pace of current innovation development, governing agencies have struggled to manage the negative externalities and risks of new technologies. At the same time, an exclusive focus on de-risking may limit necessary government concentration on harnessing a new technology’s unrealized benefits. Proactive technology governance must balance both mitigating harms and harnessing innovative benefits by establishing a mutable and iterative risk-based approach, focusing governance specifically on highly consequential use cases, both good and bad.
We cannot and should not regulate every AI development and use. Rather, regulatory efforts should focus on AI highly consequential to society. Building on SCSP’s Framework for Identifying Highly Consequential AI Use Cases (HCAI), governing agencies can devise systems of identifying technologies that have or will have significant impacts on society, whether beneficial or harmful, and adjust regulations accordingly to avoid overregulation.[28] As each agency and its respective technology sector has to consider different degrees of risk tolerance, technical requirements, and innovation ecosystems in governance, building a sector-specific governance structure that is iterative and adaptable is critical for balancing innovation with regulation. These systems should build off existing risk-management strategies toward agency use of AI.[29]
Data is foundational to effective implementation of governance strategies and policies. Regulatory agencies will require access to relevant and usable information to make necessary assessments and take actions. Fundamentally, the United States must adopt a comprehensive National Data Policy. The free and secure flow of data can allow greater trust and communication between private-public partnerships and a deeper understanding of the “black box” of innovation and its risks.[30] However, good governance must also maintain awareness of the risks of open source research and devise new methodologies and approaches to identify and protect sensitive R&D information.[31] To facilitate trust and deeper cooperation among our democratic allies, the United States must integrate these research and data security protections into new global efforts to establish innovation supply chains as technology becomes more costly and globalized.
Additionally, the United States must continue its work on establishing standards and norms to implement AI governance. For example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) can develop risk and bias identification systems that help frame the regulation of new technologies, building off the structure of the NIST AI Risk Management Framework.[32] Risk identification should also integrate non-traditional understandings of risk and national security as environmental, social, equity, developmental risks are all critical to technology governance. Some risks are inherent. To build trust in new technologies, all innovation must be provided a standard of privacy and cybersecurity to avoid structural risk; privacy-enhancing technologies, red-teaming, and other government-supported tools can be made available to all innovators to maintain such standards.
Technologies Determining the Future of National and Innovation Power
In an era of unprecedented technological advancement, the United States, together with its allies, stands at a pivotal juncture. We have the opportunity — indeed, the responsibility — to shape the future of innovation in a way that reflects our shared aspirations and values, and upholds the principles that have long defined our democracies. By forging a united vision and investing strategically in fields like next-generation AI, including AGI, biotechnology, advanced networks, advanced computing, next-generation energy, advanced manufacturing, we will not only fuel economic growth and prosperity but also ensure that these transformative technologies are harnessed for the greater good. This is our chance to lead the world toward a future where innovation uplifts humanity, protects our planet, and strengthens the bonds of freedom and collaboration that bind us together.
It is imperative for the United States to maintain its leadership in artificial intelligence (AI) and proactively accelerate and address the development of Artificial General Intelligence.[33] To that end, the United States should stand up a task force[34] composed of technologists and leaders from the legislative branch, the executive branch, industry, civil society, and academia to develop a comprehensive national strategy encompassing four critical objectives:
- Analyze the Pre-Arrival Phase: Thoroughly assess the current landscape, including our nation’s technological standing, potential adversaries’ capabilities, present bottlenecks, and the key requirements for achieving AGI. This involves examining hardware, data, software, and potential pathways from narrow AI to AGI.
- Prepare the Country for AGI’s Impact: Develop a plan to address the transformative effects of AGI on the American workforce, education system, society, and geopolitical landscape as a whole. This includes anticipating potential disruptions and implementing measures to ensure a smooth transition.
- Establish Robust Policies: Propose comprehensive policies to govern the development and deployment of AGI systems, ensuring alignment with American laws, democratic values, international norms, and ethical principles. This framework will safeguard against misuse and ensure that AGI benefits humanity while mitigating potential risks.
- Coordinate with Like-Minded International Partners: Establish a collaborative mechanism (e.g., consultative working group) to ensure the development of AGI systems in the United States fosters joint R&D, collaborative standards and governance setting, and sharing of best practices with close allies and partners.
By embracing these four objectives, the United States can proactively shape the path toward AGI, harnessing its transformative potential while upholding the values that define our nation.
Yet AGI alone will be insufficient to lead the era of innovation power. AI will converge with other technologies that will drive the destiny of nations. Global technology leadership will accrue to the nation(s) that master the full set of convergent general purpose technologies. The process and outcome of developing national AGI capabilities could directly feed into and be accelerated by establishing national programs or moonshots in other critical technology sectors, such as:
We are on the precipice of an era where individuals and nation-states alike will have the data and the tools to manipulate the essence of life as we know it. Biotechnology will generate massive opportunities in industries that span medicine, manufacturing, materials, agriculture, energy, and much more. The United States and our allies and partners have an opportunity to outcompete our rivals to gather the data, build the platforms, and create the infrastructure for the bioeconomy. Yet biology knows no borders. Its impacts will be inherently diffuse and interconnected. This creates distinct benefits and risks in the context of a global competition. A strong security baseline will enable us to step confidently into a world where we can build with biology.
The establishment of a standing Medshield could build upon current biotechnology initiatives and combine with other moonshots and strategic moves to secure the U.S. biofuture. A national medical shield would operationalize pathogen defense and act as a global biothreat “radar,” negating the need for a reactive effort with every new medical crisis. This national medical shield would harness and spur public-private innovations across the biotechnology sector and tech categories such as rapid vaccines, therapeutics, biothreat detection, AI-driven modeling, accelerated manufacturing, and enhanced trials.[35]
Advanced networks form the foundation of the modern world, underpinning global communications and embedded into computing, sensing, and AI capabilities. Nations that lead the development and production of advanced network hardware and software will control elements of the digital economy—from cybersecurity to new network-enabled applications like autonomy and robotics. Therefore, the nation must invest in critical research and real-world pilots, enact policies that lower barriers to innovators, and foster distributed disruptive network innovation.
A national program to develop free space optical networks (FSONs) at scale would be one step toward U.S. advantage within this sector. FSONs — commonly referred to as “fiber without the fiber” — would enable point-to-point communications through air, space, and water via lasers while reducing the dependency on terrestrial-based infrastructure and serve a multitude of applications across the defense, industrial, logistics, agricultural, and consumer sectors.[36] With the potential to become a new primary or secondary connectivity option, a moonshot for FSONs, combined with a secure, resilient supply chain, would accelerate the nation’s path to 5G and beyond.[37]
Computational power, or compute, underpins AI capabilities as well as scientific and technological progress across all fields. Today, however, an asymmetry exists between the rapid rate of progress in AI and the much slower gains in compute performance and cost that the semiconductor industry can provide. This asymmetry is the culprit behind the ongoing massive global data center buildout and rapid growth in energy usage and subsequent rising costs for AI training and inference. Yet novel compute paradigms exist that could catalyze a 1,000 times or greater improvement in performance and energy usage. Beyond that, the United States must catalyze disruptive innovation and build an atoms-to-architecture pipeline that develops, scales, and integrates novel materials and devices to unlock novel microelectronics and computing paradigms.
A national program that aims to integrate multiple forms of compute would help the United States lead a post-Moore’s Law world. A hybrid computing approach, backed by the appropriate software stacks and APIs, could apply the right compute “tool” to hard problems. Creating a moonshot and charging a National Mission Manager to develop hybrid computing architectures would not only tackle immense societal challenges by integrating AI across diverse computing paradigms from conventional CMOS to novel hardware-based approaches but also would allow the United States to have a dominant advantage in microelectronics past this decade.[38]
The ability to produce and use energy when and where it is needed is central to securing technological and geopolitical advantages. Energy cuts across all domains and is not only an input for future technologies but is also transformed by them. As the global energy system evolves due to increased demand and a shift in how we generate, store, and move energy, U.S. leadership in the sector will require a diversified approach — not a silver bullet.
Pushing fusion energy from the lab to the grid within the next decade is one pathway to securing U.S. positional advantage in next-generation energy technologies. Fusion offers a source of clean, limitless energy, bringing the power of the sun to Earth. A national program to deliver multiple, energy-producing fusion pilot plants to the grid should encourage multiple technical pathways and expand upon existing programs to encourage fusion development. Reaching the goal of functioning fusion pilot plants would not only push the boundaries of scientific achievement but establish the foundations of a policy apparatus for a future thriving fusion ecosystem.[39]
An array of emerging technologies — from AI and robotics to augmented reality and physics-based modeling — are converging to create a new paradigm for designing and making things. This paradigm, often called advanced manufacturing, is premised on convergence between the physical and digital worlds. Today’s cutting-edge factories are fully integrated cyber-physical systems, powered by an AI-enabled “digital thread” running from product design through deployment. These systems create actionable data that can be fed back into industrial AI models, creating tighter feedback loops that deliver significant innovation advantages. In practice, advanced manufacturing means producing goods in a way that is faster, more flexible, and sustainable.
To ensure positional leadership in advanced manufacturing, the United States should establish the construction of 500 Factories on the Frontier as a national goal. These leading-edge facilities would deploy advanced manufacturing technologies in innovative ways and exemplify a software-defined approach to production. A small number of these facilities exist today, but firms of all sizes face challenges, from high capital costs to shortages of workers and system integrators. A national program would track the construction of facilities and offer federal support, in the form of tax incentives and access to system integration capabilities.[40]
[1] The Office of Scientific Research & Development was established in 1941 with the goal of coordinating, supporting, and enhancing experimental, scientific, and medical research efforts relevant to national defense. See EO 8807, Establishing the Office of Scientific Research and Development in the Executive Office of the President and Defining Its Functions and Duties (1941).
[2] Vannevar Bush, Science – The Endless Frontier, United States Government Printing Office (1945).
[3] During the years that passed between the report’s publication and the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, a few alternative proposals were floated; of these, Harley Kilgore’s version provided the starkest contrast to Bush’s. Kilgore’s proposal asserted a strong mandate for the agency, non-scientist civilian control, funding for applied research (rather than just basic research), and support for the social sciences. The National Science Foundation Act of 1950 ended up closely resembling Bush’s proposal, notably including his scientist-led approach and exclusion of applied research. See Daniel Lee Kleinman, Politics on the Endless Frontier, Duke University Press (1995).
[4] Federal R&D Budget Dashboard, American Association for the Advancement of Science (last accessed 2024).
[5] Daniel P. Gross & Bhaven N. Sampat, Inventing the Endless Frontier: The Effects of the World War II Research Effort on Post-War Innovation, Harvard Business School at 5-6 (2020).
[6] For example, National Science Foundation-funded research on solid-state physics and ceramics led to the development of modern day fiber-optic communication systems. On the software side, research from the National Center for Supercomputing Applications led to the development of what we know of today as web browsers and Internet interfaces. See Fiber Optics – Nifty 50, National Science Foundation (last accessed 2024); Web Browsers – Nifty 50, National Science Foundation (last accessed 2024).
[7] See Xian-En Zhang, et al., 加强基础研究夯实科技自立自强根基 (Strengthen Basic Research and Consolidate Foundation for Self-Reliance and Self-Improvement in Science and Technology), Chinese Academy of Sciences (2023) (referencing Vannevar Bush’s Science: the Endless Frontier, recognizing the important role of funding basic research as a measure to help achieve strategic self-reliance).
[8] The ecosystem has pressed beyond Bush’s original triangle of innovation, composed of the government, academia, and industry. “The Crowd” has emerged as a powerful actor, driving open-source research in domains like intelligence and AI. Private capital has emerged as an influential funding source of tech development, and industry has over time become the primary funder and executor of applied research and development. The government, meanwhile, continues to fund the majority of basic research, but its ability to steer the trajectory of innovation has atrophied. See Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation, Special Competitive Studies Project at 22-29 (2022).
[9] Aia Sarycheva & Mark Muro, Beyond VC: Financing Technology Entrepreneurship in the Rest of America, Brookings (2021); Competitiveness Through Entrepreneurship: A Strategy for U.S. Innovation, National Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Department of Commerce (2024).
[10] Ben Purser & Pavneet Singh, Unlocking U.S. Technological Competitiveness, Institute for Security and Technology (2024). Oihana Basilio Ruiz de Apodaca, et al., What is “Deep Tech” and What are Deep Tech Ventures?, MIT Management Global Programs (2023).
[11] Vannevar Bush, Science – The Endless Frontier, United States Government Printing Office (1945).
[12] The priorities align with Driving U.S. Innovation in Artificial Intelligence: A Roadmap for Artificial Intelligence Policy in the United States Senate, The Bipartisan Senate AI Working Group (2024).
[13] Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation, Special Competitive Studies Project at 30 (2022).
[14] Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation, Special Competitive Studies Project at 55-56 (2022).
[15] Jean-François Bobier, et al., An Investor’s Guide to Deep Tech, Boston Consulting Group (2023).
[16] In the last 46 years, the U.S. Government’s budget has often been appropriated by Continuing Resolutions (CR), which keep funding flat, freeze new programs and projects, and ultimately, slow critical R&D down. See Alessandra Zimmermann, Impacts of a Continuing Resolution, American Association for the Advancement of Science (2024); Final Report: Defense Resourcing for the Future, Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Reform, U.S. Department of Defense (2024); Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation, Special Competitive Studies Project at 26 (2022); Darrell M. West, R&D For the Public Good: Ways to Strengthen Societal Innovation in the United States, Brookings (2022).
[17] National Action Plan for U.S. Leadership in Next Generation Energy, Special Competitive Studies Project at 10 (2024); Ben Purser & Pavneet Singh, Unlocking U.S. Technological Competitiveness, Institute for Security and Technology (2024); Oihana Basilio Ruiz de Apodaca, et al., What Is “Deep Tech” And What Are Deep Tech Ventures?, MIT Management Global Programs (2023).
[18] Federal R&D expenditure equaling 1% of GDP in 2030 is benchmark for future funding levels and would be roughly equivalent to the proportion the federal government spent on R&D during the 1960s and 1970s to accomplish the Apollo Mission. In 2022, federal R&D spending as a percentage of GDP was 0.73%. See Historical Trends in Federal R&D, American Association for the Advancement of Science (last accessed 2024); Funding for the Future: The Case for Federal R&D Spending, Special Competitive Studies Project (2024).
[19] Federal funding for non-defense AI R&D should double annually to reach $32 billion in 2026 to take full advantage of AI’s convergence with other science and technological sectors, as well as encourage the development of the AI field itself. Federal investment should support AI and AI-enabled research, and critical R&D infrastructure, such as the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR). See Funding for the Future: The Case for Federal R&D Spending, Special Competitive Studies Project (2024); Driving U.S. Innovation in Artificial Intelligence: A Roadmap for Artificial Intelligence Policy in the United States Senate, The Bipartisan Senate Working Group (2024).
[20] See Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation Special Competitive Studies Project at 40-41 (2022); Andrew J. Fieldhouse & Karel Mertens, The Returns to Government R&D: Evidence from U.S. Appropriations Shocks, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (2023); John Paschkewtiz & Dan Patt, No, We Don’t Need Another ARPA, Issues in Science and Technology (2023); Karine Khatcherian, Barriers to the Timely Deployment of Climate Infrastructure, Prime Coalition (2022). Arielle D’Souza, How To Reuse the Operation Warp Speed Model, Institute for Progress (2023).
[21] A White House-based TCC would serve as a central hub to coordinate national tech strategy. An OCA — based either in the White House or an FFRDC — would provide a consistent analytic center across administrations. Finally, a parallel federally chartered non-profit, USATF, would offer an external convening function and additional analytic capabilities. See Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation, Special Competitive Studies Project at 49-58 and 93-102 (2022).
[22] Maryann Feldman, Place-Based Economic Development, Issues in Science and Technology (2022).
[23] Policy Summary, Jump-Starting America (last accessed 2024).
[24] Grace J. Wang, Revisiting the Connection Between Innovation, Education, and Regional Economic Growth Between, Issues in Science and Technology (2024); Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation, Special Competitive Studies Project at 22-29 (2022).
[25] The federal government should continue to provide resources for NSF’s Directorate for Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships to allow for future Regional Innovation Engines awards and modernize the Economic Development Administration’s mission and expand its authorities to further support local innovation and economic development. Despite receiving sizable funding for many new place-based innovation programs in legislation like the CHIPS and Science Act, EDA’s mission has not been reauthorized or updated since 2004 and should be refreshed to align with the EDA’s new regionally focused programs and today’s techno-economic challenges. See Amy Liu, et al., Making Local Economies Prosperous and Resilient: The Case for a Modern Economic Development Administration, Brookings (2022); Mark Muro, With its Winners Announced, The Regional Innovation Engines Program Moves to Expand Place-Based R&D, Brookings (2024); Ryan Buscaglia & Melissa Roberts Chapman, Cluster Development is the New Economic Development, Federation of American Scientists (2023).
[26] Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation, Special Competitive Studies Project at 28 (2022).
[27] The defining feature of a regional innovation ecosystem that works well is the connections between institutions, resources, and capabilities that combine to shape and build upon the regional comparative advantage of that region. It is necessary to right-size these bridging mechanisms to a region’s current resources and strengths, as, for example, what works in Boston might not work in Birmingham, Alabama. See Jorge Guzman, et al., Accelerating Innovation Ecosystems: The Promise and Challenges of Regional Innovation Engines, National Bureau of Economic Research (2023); Jan Jard, et al., Melissa Roberts Chapman & Alice Wu, What Works in Boston, Won’t Necessarily Work in Birmingham: 4 Principles for Building Commercial Capacity in Innovation Ecosystems, Federation of American Scientists (2023); David Rotman, The $100 Billion Bet that a Postindustrial U.S. City Can Reinvent Itself as a High-Tech Hub, MIT Technology Review (2023); Our Mission, The Engine Accelerator (last accessed 2024); Ventures, Capital Factory (last accessed 2024).
[28] Framework for Identifying Highly Consequential AI Use Cases, Special Competitive Studies Project (2023).
[29] Advancing Governance, Innovation, and Risk Management for Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence, U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2024).
[30] National Data Action Plan, Special Competitive Studies Project (2022).
[31] Safeguarding the Research Enterprise, JASON (2024).
[32] AI Risk Management Framework, U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (2023).
[33] In the U.S. Senate, one major initiative that seeks to chart a path toward U.S. leadership in AI, is outlined in the report: Driving U.S. Innovation in Artificial Intelligence: A Roadmap for Artificial Intelligence Policy in the United States Senate, The Bipartisan Senate AI Working Group (2024).
[34] In The Age of AI and Our Human Future, co-authors Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, and Daniel Huttenlocher underscored how many countries, including our adversaries, have made AI an institutionalized national priority, whereas the United States “has not yet as a nation, systematically explored its scope, studied its implications or begun the process of reconciling with it.” While the United States has made strides on this front, still more can be done. In the book, Kissinger and Schmidt went on to recommend standing up a commission with two functions, to study how the United States can remain intellectually and strategically competitive in AI and more globally, to study and raise the awareness of AI and its cultural implications. These goals should be part of the remit of the proposed task force. See Henry Kissinger, et al., The Age of AI and Our Human Future, Little, Brown and Company at 224-225 (2021).
[35] To learn more about SCSP’s recommendation to establish Medshield and other biotechnology moonshots, see National Action Plan for U.S. Leadership in Biotechnology, Special Competitive Studies Project (2023).
[36] Ben Skuse, Free Space Optics to Connect the World, The International Society for Optics and Photonics (2023).
[37] To learn more about SCSP’s recommendation to establish a national program on free-space optical networks and other advanced networks moonshots, see National Action Plan for U.S. Leadership in Advanced Networks, Special Competitive Studies Project (2023).
[38] To learn more about SCSP’s recommendation to establish a national program on hybrid computing architectures and other advanced compute and microelectronics moonshots, see National Action Plan for U.S. Leadership in Advanced Compute & Microelectronics, Special Competitive Studies Project (2023).
[39] To learn more about SCSP’s recommendation to establish a moonshot on fusion energy and other energy-related initiatives, see National Action Plan for U.S. Leadership in Next-Generation Energy, Special Competitive Studies Project (2024).
[40] More details can be found in SCSP’s forthcoming National Action Plan for U.S. Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing, which will be published in the Summer of 2024.