By many measures, the United States is poised for economic preeminence in the twenty-first century. America has favorable demographics, a diverse and productive labor force, and continues to attract the world’s top talent. It is home to the most valuable companies on the planet and has the deepest and most liquid capital markets, while the U.S. dollar continues to enjoy global reserve currency status, granting the United States significant financial power. Compounding these advantages, the United States maintains an unrivaled network of allies and partners, with fellow democracies accounting for more than 60 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP).[1] Meanwhile, the U.S. innovation ecosystem continues to propel the U.S. economy forward, boosting productivity and economic growth in a time of rising geopolitical turbulence and macroeconomic uncertainty.
U.S. firms and research outfits are spearheading the AI revolution, conferring tremendous long-run benefits on the United States. Generative AI has already diffused widely across the enterprise software sector and shifted the boundaries for scientific discovery. As the decade progresses, AI will increasingly shape the world of hardware, accelerating the pace of innovation in deep technology sectors like robotics, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, and nuclear energy.[2] The United States has a once-in-a-century opportunity to leverage its lead in software and AI to create durable advantages in these fields, boosting productivity and economic growth.
This window of opportunity comes at a pivotal time. For all its economic advantages, the nation remains inadequately positioned for long-term competition for market share in strategic technology sectors. These “advanced industries,” from aerospace to biotechnology and microelectronics, are vital to the U.S. economy: they account for the majority of U.S. exports and R&D, provide large numbers of high-wage STEM jobs, and make an outsized contribution to U.S. GDP.[3] Leadership in these industries also offers strategic benefits. Production capacity for key inputs and technology platforms creates leverage to advance domestic and foreign policy priorities, deter adversaries, and fight and win wars. Yet decades of outsourcing have eroded the nation’s ability to produce key technologies at home, contributing to workforce shortages across strategic sectors in the process.
Compounding matters, the fracturing of the post-Cold War economic order is forcing policymakers to confront the challenges posed by China’s dominance in advanced industries. Between 1998 and 2020, the PRC’s share of global output in these sectors grew from 3 percent to 25 percent.[4] Much of this growth has come at the expense of the United States and its allies and partners. Despite economic headwinds, the PRC continues to devote staggering amounts of resources to increase market share in strategic industries, doubling down on mercantilist policies that entrench China’s position by flooding global markets with subsidized exports.[5] Meanwhile, the CCP continues to cultivate partnerships with autocratic regimes, including Russia and Iran, which receive critical material support and diplomatic cover from Beijing.
The United States must position itself for competition for market share in advanced industries. This will require implementing a coherent, long-term techno-industrial strategy[6] that promotes technology diffusion — the key driver of long-term productivity growth — and addresses key national security gaps, such as the erosion of the U.S. defense industrial base. Such a strategy must be pursued in a focused, sustained, and apolitical way, and will require building or overhauling institutions associated with economic competitiveness to ensure they are fit for purpose. It will require targeted action across three interlocking areas.[7]
First, the United States can rebuild lost production capacity by making major investments in advanced manufacturing technologies. Advanced manufacturing is ground zero for the technological convergence between bits and atoms. Leveraging technologies such as industrial AI, robotics, and additive manufacturing to drive production in a direction that is more distributed, flexible, and sustainable can begin to offset China’s advantages in scale-based manufacturing. These efforts should be supported by technology and policy moves in advanced networks, which will be needed to provide connectivity for intelligent assets on the factory floor.
Second, competitiveness will require deepening strategic trade and investment relationships with allies and partners centered around key technology battlegrounds. Friendshoring production can provide alternative access to sources of supply for critical technology inputs, while signing targeted trade agreements is necessary to open additional markets for goods produced by firms in the United States. Moreover, the United States and key allies and partners, recognizing the risks of technology entanglement with an adversary, must continue to employ targeted measures to limit China’s access to strategically significant technologies and markets.
Third, the nation must ensure its workforce can compete in an era characterized by the convergence of physical and digital technologies. Currently, America’s domestic workforce development ecosystem and immigration programs are not designed or resourced to win the talent competition. Regaining U.S. advantage will require reimagining how we train domestic talent, recruit and retain international talent, and empower workers to adapt to accelerating technological change. It must also involve harnessing the power of AI to equalize access and opportunity for all Americans. Both digital and AI skills, as well as trade skills, will matter in the economy of the future.
America Builds: Production Capacity as Geopolitical Power
Positioning the United States for leadership in advanced industries requires revitalizing the U.S. techno-industrial base. A foundational element of national power, production capacity in advanced industries underpins the United States’ ability to compete across key technology battlegrounds and, if necessary, prevail in protracted conflict.
Recent years have seen significant investment in strategic high-tech industrial sectors, from microelectronics to clean energy. Despite this momentum, however, the United States continues to lag behind China in terms of technology-intensive manufacturing capacity, with waning market share in advanced industry segments that matter for economic competitiveness and national security, including machinery, electrical equipment, EV batteries, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and maritime hardware. Since entering the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the PRC has risen to become the world’s dominant advanced industrial superpower, posing significant challenges to U.S. and allied economic competitiveness and security.[8][9]
When the United States organized its innovation system after World War II, the nation accounted for half of the world’s total manufacturing capacity.[10] But decades of outsourcing have eroded U.S. production capacity, severing the link between innovation and production. Recent years have seen growing efforts to reestablish this link by building out the institutional infrastructure required to restore the U.S. industrial commons. Unfortunately, the core national programs that anchor the U.S. production innovation system — Manufacturing USA and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) — remain underfunded by an order of magnitude compared to other industrialized economies. These programs will need to be resourced as national strategic assets if the United States is to lead in advanced industries of the future.[11]
In addition to funding core programs, the United States should ensure better coordination of government resources for advanced manufacturing programs at all levels. For example, this could include establishing a White House Advanced Manufacturing Office, backed by a dedicated staff and institutional resources to drive strategic alignment among the various manufacturing-related initiatives, and institutions.[12] Moreover, the Department of Commerce could appoint a panel of outside experts in a Commerce Innovation Board, modeled on the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Board, to advise the Department of Commerce on innovation and industrial policy.
Advanced manufacturing involves the application of computation, sensing, and networking technologies to production processes, creating highly integrated cyber-physical systems that can produce goods smarter, faster, and more sustainably.[13] Establishing national-level objectives — such as building 1,000 software-defined, intelligent factories — would jumpstart efforts to dramatically boost U.S. industrial base capacity. These facilities would capitalize on U.S. software advantages to compete on cost, customization, and rapid production innovation.
Beyond driving the creation of large-scale factories of the future, there is an urgent need to democratize, domestically, the access to advanced manufacturing technologies. Small- and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) are the backbone of the U.S. manufacturing sector, but lag behind in terms of technology adoption.[14] A revitalized MEP program, for example, could serve as a system integrator, helping SMMs to deploy technologies like industrial AI and robotics. In addition, policymakers should make it a strategic priority to close capital access gaps for SMMs seeking to pursue digital transformation.
Tremendous amounts of capital are required to take technologies from prototypes to products that are manufactured at scale. But the time horizons of many private investors often do not align with manufacturing business models — unless governments can absorb a share of the risk. The United States should explore the establishment of new public-private financing mechanisms, and the augmentation of existing authorities, for funding techno-industrial enterprises. Providing scale-up financing for technology-intensive manufacturing firms will prove critical to competing for global market share in advanced industries with other advanced economies and the PRC.[15]
To meet this need, the United States should leverage and expand existing authorities, such as the Export-Import Bank’s Make More in America Initiative and the Defense Production Act, to provide direct assistance for domestic producers. The United States should also consider establishing new financing mechanisms, such as blended funds, which would leverage public funding to de-risk private investment in capital-intensive enterprises.[16] Finally, U.S. policymakers should also explore opportunities to work with allies and partners on these efforts.
While PRC producers won the first round of the competition for leadership in advanced networks by deploying 5G hardware globally, the next round of competition is just beginning.[17] Deploying advanced manufacturing technologies, especially industrial AI systems, will require building out the requisite advanced networking technologies domestically and with trusted partners. The United States, working with allies and partners with complementary strengths, must catalyze the development of network core, radio access network (RAN), Internet of Things (IoT), and satellite components in order to protect its industrial infrastructure from dependence on PRC-produced technologies, while also placing further restrictions on components made in countries of concern.[18]
Malicious actors can also target cyber-physical systems from a rapidly growing number of threat vectors beyond compromised networks. Ensuring cyber-physical systems are secure and defensible will require promoting transparency and provenance across an entire system — from the software codebases and AI training datasets to hardware components.[19] And as adversaries deploy increasingly powerful AI systems for autonomous cyber operations, keeping up will require developing and deploying AI-enabled cyberdefenses at scale.[20]
Strength In Numbers: Market Alliances and Economic Statecraft
Decades of outsourcing have left democratic market economies heavily reliant on the PRC for critical technology inputs and advanced industrial capacity. According to one estimate, the United States and its allies annually import $1 trillion worth of strategically critical goods from China and states in its orbit, out of $5 trillion sourced globally.[21] For years, Beijing has exploited the dynamism and openness of market economies, employing a range of brute force tactics to displace global competitors in strategic industries. These actions and others undermine U.S. national security and economic competitiveness by eroding domestic advanced industrial capacity and ceding technological know-how.
Recent developments in the international economic environment present the United States with opportunities to recalibrate its strategic posture and, in particular, alleviate dependence on the PRC. U.S. market demand alone for emerging technologies represents roughly a third of global technology spending, providing the United States with leverage that can be multiplied by working with other democratic market economies.[22] By deepening trade relationships, democracies can pool their market demand, mitigating dependence on adversaries while providing new markets for exports.[23] To win, the United States must build a values-aligned trade architecture while organizing government institutions for enduring rivalry.
Democratic market economies in Asia and Europe are home to some of the world’s most robust technology innovation ecosystems and offer substantial markets for U.S. technology exports. The United States should establish strategic trade agreements with allies and partners,[24] creating a resilient ecosystem that provides access to upstream components and pooling market demand in critical sectors. Targeted sectoral arrangements with key allies and partners — starting with countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan — can be forged to secure supply chains and lower costs for key inputs such as IoT modules, networking components, and critical minerals.[25] Particular attention should be paid to securing electronic components powered by legacy microelectronics, given their outsized role in critical infrastructure sectors around the world.[26] Decision-makers should also prioritize establishing digital trade rules with allies and partners to govern cross-border data flows, promote interoperability, and safeguard sensitive information from foreign exploitation.
In addition to advancing bilateral trade agreements, the United States must foster the emergence of a new, technology-focused trade architecture built for an era of competition. The WTO has not demonstrated an ability to hold Beijing accountable for its transgressions. The PRC has systematically undermined industries in the United States and other democratic market economies via a range of exploitative tactics including forced technology transfer, IP theft, unfair state aid, and preferential treatment, without a serious response from the WTO, which is hampered by its global membership. Instead of abandoning the institution, the United States should work with like-minded partners to incrementally establish a trading framework that lowers thresholds for rule-of-law, market economies; increases barriers for bad actors; and facilitates flows of technology and trade among market economies. This architecture follows the traditions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — the Cold War-era precursor to the WTO — which was intended as a trading body for market economies under the rule of law.[27] Under this framework, managed economies such as then-Communist Poland and Romania were not entirely cut out, but were offered the prospect of managed trade.[28] Similarly, a “GATT 3.0” would prevent bad actors from exploiting access to democratic market economies.
Finally, to deepen foreign markets for U.S. emerging technology exports, the United States should establish a Tech Export Accelerator to boost American technology flows to allies and partners.[29] Staffed by specialists knowledgeable about U.S. government financing and commercial advocacy tools and relevant foreign markets, this “one-stop shop” would work hand in hand with U.S. companies and overseas missions to identify major project opportunities, support proposal development, and drive sales across the finish line.
To-date, U.S. responses to China’s brute force economic tactics have been case-by-case and largely reactive. In an era where the PRC is weaponizing economic interdependence to gain a stranglehold on strategic industries, the United States must reset the terms of the bilateral economic relationship.[30] In particular, trade authorities like Section 301 and Section 232 allow for unilateral action against a wide range of unfair practices, from IP theft to market-distorting subsidies.[31] Officials must continue to make creative use of these tools to counter malign statecraft practices that threaten U.S. national and economic security.
Recent years have seen growing use of export controls to restrict adversaries’ access to dual-use technologies. To maximize the efficacy of these controls, the United States should further empower the Department of Commerce by strengthening licensing policy, boosting enforcement capacity, and accelerating the adoption of AI and open-source intelligence tools. Moreover, the Department of Commerce should develop and apply sector- or country-wide controls that cover entire sectors, eliminating loopholes that adversaries have managed to exploit. These steps must be complemented by creation of a plurilateral export control regime, in conjunction with allies and partners, focused on a range of battleground technologies.[32]
As international economic policy continues to become critical to national security, the United States needs a coordinated national approach to economic security. First, the President should appoint a White House lead for economic security, responsible for coordinating the use of economic statecraft tools across the interagency. This lead, dual-hatted between the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Economic Council (NEC), would lead the development of a National Economic Security Strategy.[33] The strategy would set strategic objectives and coordinate the use of tools such as export controls and sanctions, alongside other levers of national power such as diplomacy and economic incentives, to ensure maximum effectiveness and a holistic national approach and messaging.
Second, the United States must equip its economic institutions for strategic competition by deploying technology tools and making targeted organizational moves. Rapid advancements in commercially available AI-enabled platforms, for example, can help government teams analyze vast quantities of supply chain data to detect chokepoints and enforce restrictions. Organizations on the front lines of economic competition — such as the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and International Trade Administration (ITA), as well as the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the International Trade Commission — must be staffed and resourced to conduct comprehensive techno-industrial analyses, map U.S. and foreign innovation ecosystems, and identify economic vulnerabilities and chokepoints.
Enduring Advantage: Winning the Talent Competition
The United States and China are locked in a global competition for technical talent that carries strategic implications for future innovation and growth. There is evidence that China is gaining ground in the talent competition: one recent analysis showed that the PRC increased its share of top AI research talent from 11 percent to 28 percent between 2019 and 2022, while the share of top AI research talent working in the United States dropped from 59 percent to 42 percent.[34] The United States also suffers from talent shortages across its advanced industries, with acute shortages in strategic sectors such as defense industrial base, manufacturing, and semiconductors. Ultimately, the country that can train, recruit, and retain the world’s top talent will gain an outsized advantage across both innovation and production.
At the same time, the world has entered a technological revolution that will transform the workforce and usher in a new global economy. At present, the U.S. education, workforce, and immigration systems are neither designed nor resourced to ensure the nation wins the talent competition. A U.S. techno-industrial strategy must include significant investments in the human capital needed to build a resilient industrial base — guided by data and analysis on the mix of technical and non-technical skills in demand — while ensuring all Americans can access reskilling and upskilling opportunities.
A future where U.S. talent leads globally starts with setting up learners for success early. All students need early exposure and access to the latest technologies, including AI. AI tools can provide customized education, problem solving techniques, and upskilling for learners of all ages and match teachers, students, and school districts to experiential learning opportunities, mentors, and the latest educational resources. Although a considerable amount of educational technology, including AI-enabled learning, is already on the market, it is not equitably accessible or leveraged across public school districts.[35]
The United States must bring AI into classrooms to prepare all Americans for an AI-enabled future. This could involve leveraging existing federal programs and novel grant competitions to provide dedicated resourcing for states to integrate AI-enabled educational technology into all public K-16 classrooms. Additionally, professional development programs for educators and incentives for industry to lend AI, cyber, and emerging technology practitioners to schools would increase the relevance and quality of AI education. But in order to succeed, these national programs must also be paired with robust efforts to teach AI principles and responsible use.
A variety of studies and anecdotal reports indicate that advanced industries in the United States are experiencing crippling workforce shortages.[36] However, there is no official national data on supply and demand for skills and competencies across the U.S. workforce, hindering attempts to invest systemically in education programming and workforce planning at the national, regional, and local level. Lack of actionable data also fosters inertia toward avoiding necessary reforms and limits incentives toward creating pathways into high-demand, high-wage careers outside of a traditional four-year college degree.
A workforce framework and corresponding talent marketplace for critical and emerging technologies can address existing workforce data, credentialing, and talent matching challenges. Such frameworks define the core work roles and responsibilities needed in these fields, along with the associated knowledge, skills, abilities, and tasks for each role to enable workforce development program alignment.[37] One example of a role that should be added under this framework is the “Technologist” — a reference to manufacturing workers of the future equipped with the skills to succeed in highly dynamic production environments, demonstrating fluency in both digital systems management and traditional manufacturing tasks, such as operating heavy machinery. In addition, the United States should create a national career entry network to scale apprenticeships for advanced industries. Previous attempts to normalize and scale apprenticeships have failed, in part because there is no national network that can enhance the scale and financial viability of local and regional hubs.
Leading the techno-economic competition must include being a global beacon for the best and brightest innovators in emerging technologies. In 2022, over half of computer and mathematical scientists and engineers working in the United States were foreign-born.[38] Research also shows high-skilled immigrants have a significant impact driving U.S. innovation through patent applications and contributions to AI research.[39] While the United States still leads as a destination of choice for foreign-born STEM talent to study and work, its leadership is in jeopardy, at a time when bipartisan consensus on immigration reform is elusive and other countries are implementing appealing talent recruitment policies.[40] Losing the lead in attracting foreign-born talent would have significant negative repercussions, as these individuals represent a large portion of U.S. STEM graduate students and are essential to the strength of the U.S. technology sector.
To secure leadership in attracting the world’s top talent, the United States must significantly expand the H1-B and O-1 (exceptionally qualified) visa programs for critical and emerging technology skills. It is well-documented that current H1-B visa caps do not adequately meet U.S. employers’ immediate high-skilled talent needs, limiting U.S. competitiveness and preventing policymakers from addressing workforce shortages in strategic sectors like microelectronics.[41] Recent White House actions to address this challenge are a promising start, but ultimately Congress must take action to reform the current system.[42] The Departments of Homeland Security and State must also be provided with resources to accelerate the current process for visa application and processing.
The challenges affecting the U.S. education and labor ecosystems are well-documented, yet the causes and consequences have little consensus. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have tried to address the leaky STEM talent pipeline, for example, but with mixed or limited success. This status quo imperils U.S. competitiveness as the nation enters a new global economy defined by rapid technological change. The United States should establish a National Commission on the Future of Work[43] with an action-oriented mission, similar to the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI). A Commission would not only analyze the landscape, similar to work done by private and academic institutes like MIT’s Work of the Future Initiative,[44] but would have a more direct line to developing policy and legislation.
[1] Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani & Brett Nelson, America Powers On, Goldman Sachs (2024); Tim Orlik, et al., A Third of Global GDP Now Generated in Non-Democracies, Bloomberg (2022).
[2] Arnaud de la Tour & Massimo Portincaso, et al., Deep Tech: The Next Wave of Innovation, Boston Consulting Group (2021).
[3] Mark Muro, et al., America’s Advanced Industries: What They Are, Where They Are, and Why They Matter, Brookings Institution (2015).
[4] Robert D. Atkinson & Ian Tufts, The Hamilton Index, 2023: China Is Running Away With Strategic Industries, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation at 9, 14 (2023).
[5] Edward White & Cheng Leng, Will Xi’s Manufacturing Plan Be Enough to Rescue China’s Economy?, Financial Times (2024).
[6] This chapter builds on and updates proposals from SCSP’s original techno-industrial strategy and provides new assessments and recommendations to account for technological and geopolitical changes since that strategy’s publication in 2022. See Restoring the Sources of Techno-Economic Advantage, Special Competitive Studies Project (2022).
[7] Robert D. Atkinson, How to Win the Economic War With China, International Economy (2023).
[8] Rush Doshi, The United States, China, and the Contest for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, The Brookings Institution (2020).
[9] SCSP will expand on proposals to do so in its National Action Plan to Ensure U.S. Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing, forthcoming in 2024. The report is next in a series of action plans to “ensure U.S. leadership in key technology areas.”
[10] Melvyn Leffler, The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945–1952, Cambridge University Press (2010).
[11] David Adler & William B. Bonvillian, America’s Advanced Manufacturing Problem—and How to Fix It, American Affairs Journal (2023).
[12] William B. Bonvillian, Ensuring Manufacturing USA Reaches Its Potential, Day One Project at 9 (2021).
[13] Chandrakant D. Patel & Savi Baveja, The Rise of Cyber-Physical Systems, National Academies of Sciences (2023).
[14] Elisabeth Reynolds, et al., Digital Technology and Supply Chain Resilience: A Call to Action to Accelerate U.S. Manufacturing Competitiveness, Massachusetts Business Roundtable & Manufacturing@MIT (2023).
[15] Peter L. Singer & William B. Bonvillian, “Innovation Orchards”: Helping Tech Start-Ups Scale, Informational Technology and Innovation Foundation (2017).
[16] For financing mechanisms that support the research and development of technologies at pre-commercialization stages, see Pillar 1 of this report.
[17] Jon Pelson & Warren Wilson, Round Two of the 5G Battle Is Just Beginning. Can America Surge Ahead?, Medium (2023).
[18] Know All About Open RAN Trials, Deployments Happening Globally, Economic Times Telecom (2023).
[19] See, e.g., System of Trust Framework, MITRE (last accessed 2024).
[20] Catherine Stupp, AI Helps U.S. Intelligence Track Hackers Targeting Critical Infrastructure, The Wall Street Journal (2024).
[21] The Geoeconomic Implications of the Fractured Global Economy, Fathom Consulting (2024) (SCSP-commissioned work product). The report uses case studies and an econometric model to predict geopolitical alignment.
[22] Software and Information Technology Industry, Select USA (last accessed 2024).
[23] Robert D. Atkinson & Liza Tobin, The Missing Piece in America’s Strategy for Techno-Economic Rivalry with China, Lawfare (2023).
[24] For example, the United States could look to upgrade its existing agreements with Japan and South Korea, and pursue new bilateral trade agreements with the United Kingdom, Taiwan and India. See e.g., Matt Pottinger & Mike Gallagher, No Substitute for Victory, Foreign Affairs (2024); Clete R. Willems, It’s Time For a US-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement, Atlantic Council (2024
[25] Clete R. Willems, It’s Time For a US-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement, Atlantic Council (2024); Peter Harrell, How to Save Free Trade, Foreign Affairs (2024).
[26] National Action Plan for U.S. Leadership in Advanced Compute & Microelectronics, Special Competitive Studies Project at 34-36 (2023).
[27] SCSP would like to thank Daniel Crosby for this insight. See also Donald Clarke, GATT Membership for China?, University of Puget Sound Law Review (1993).
[28] GATT Treatment of Nonmarket Economy Countries, U.S. Government Accountability Office at Appendix I (1990).
[29] For more on the Tech Export Accelerator, see Restoring the Sources of Techno-Economic Advantage, Special Competitive Studies Project at 73 (2022).
[30] Matt Pottinger & Mike Gallagher, No Substitute for Victory, Foreign Affairs (2024).
[31] Andres B. Schwarzenberg, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Congressional Research Service (2024), Rachel F. Fefer, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congressional Research Service (2022).
[32] Restoring the Sources of Techno-Economic Advantage, Special Competitive Studies Project at 56 (2022).
[33] Henry Farrell & Abraham Newman, The New Economic Security State, Foreign Affairs (2023).
[34] Defined by the country share of where the top 20 percent of AI researchers work. See The Global AI Talent Tracker, Macro Polo (2024).
[35] Steven Mintz, Why Most Edtech Fails, Inside Higher Ed (2021).
[36] America Faces Significant Shortage of Tech Workers in Semiconductor Industry and Throughout U.S. Economy, Semiconductor Industry Association (2023); 2.1 Million Manufacturing Jobs Could Go Unfilled by 2030, National Association of Manufacturers (2021).
[37] The Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity offers a model for this initiative. See Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework), National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (last accessed 2024). See also Cyberseek, (last accessed 2024). Cyberseek is a national talent marketplace that aligns official cyber workforce standards with cyber job openings to enable skills-based hiring.
[38] The State of Science and Engineering 2024, National Science Foundation (2024).
[39] Shai Bernstein, et al., The Contribution of High-Skilled Immigrants to Innovation in the United States, National Bureau of Economic Research (2022); Sara Abdulla & Husanjot Chahal, Voices of Innovation, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (2023).
[40] See Remco Zwetsloot, China’s Approach to Tech Talent Competition, Brookings (2020); Jon Marcus, With New ‘Talent Visas,’ Other Countries Lure Workers Trained at U.S. Universities, Hechinger Report (2023).
[41] Andrew Kreighbaum, Tech Layoffs Likely Pose No Deterrent to Record H-1B Visa Demand, Bloomberg Law (2023).
[42] See Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, The White House (2023); Biden-Harris Administration Actions to Attract STEM Talent and Strengthen our Economy and Competitiveness, The White House (2022).
[43] For more on this recommendation, see Building the Generative Economy, Special Competitive Studies Project at 27-28 (2023).