When we first started our work, originally at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence from 2018 to 2021, and then as the Special Competitive Studies Project since October 2021, we were convinced that two complex sets of factors were altering the distribution of power for this decade, and for three futures beyond — the futures of geopolitics, technology, and democracy. The first set of factors we foresaw was the arrival of AI. The second set was the emergence of technology as the key battleground in the intensifying geostrategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The events that have transpired since have only solidified our conviction. The introduction of ChatGPT in November 2022 visibly ushered in the age of AI — initially in the form of generative AI, but undoubtedly as a prelude to even more powerful forms of artificial intelligence, including artificial general intelligence (AGI). Since then, the downstream opportunities that have emerged from generative AI, the influx of capital to AI-related endeavors, and the demand for AI-powering chips have all been further evidence of this new age.
As AI continues to proliferate and advance, it and other emerging technologies have continued to gain prominence in the U.S.-China competition. Microelectronics, advanced networks, biotechnology, energy, and advanced manufacturing are all key technological battlegrounds on which America’s and China’s relative positional advantages are being decided, and with them, the destiny of the world order.[1] And Beijing appears determined to dominate in all. Part of this determination is fueled by a desire to reduce dependencies on foreign technologies and preserve its leeway to make foreign policy decisions, including for potential action against Taiwan. Another part is fueled by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) desire to control its large population: what it reads, writes, buys, listens to, and thinks. Yet another part is fueled by the view that the only way out of China’s current economic and demographic conundrum, and the most assured path toward global influence, is to command the next technological frontier — or what the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has called the “new productive forces.”[2] As China pursues these emerging technologies, it is also focusing on a next wave of technologies — what it terms “future industries,” including photonic computing, brain-computer interfaces, nuclear fusion, and digital twins.[3]
China continues to be the most formidable competitor the United States has ever faced. It is also in many ways a deeply flawed one. China had a troubled exit from the COVID-19 pandemic that hobbled its post-lockdown economic recovery.[4] Coupled with deeper and more structural economic challenges that Beijing faces, the current slowdown has delayed — possibly in perpetuity — its aspiration of becoming the largest economy in the world. China’s real estate sector, previously a major component of its infrastructure investments and a driver of its economic growth, is engulfed in a crisis that has alarmed domestic consumers and foreign investors alike.[5] Its population has peaked and is now on a downward trajectory,[6] while youth unemployment remains high.[7] What is more, its leader Xi Jinping, now in an unprecedented third term in office, appears intent on prioritizing security above all else. Whether it be saber rattling over Taiwan[8] or gunboat diplomacy with the Philippines,[9] China’s security-first approach is turning the Chinese market radioactive for foreign investors.[10] Yet these systemic flaws do not make the PRC’s plans and intentions for technological dominance less concerning, and they are unlikely to bring about the downfall of the Chinese Communist Party. However, they should be recognized and factored into any strategy designed to counter China, not least because its current economic and demographic squeeze could make the PRC even more aggressive abroad.
In addition to the persistent threat posed by China, perhaps the most concerning geopolitical development of the past two years has been the emergence of an “Axis of Disruptors”: a tacit coalition of like-minded and similarly governed nations — China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea — united in their desire to upend the current world order.[11] Having sensed a hollowing out of allied defense capabilities, a fractured political will, fragile unity of purpose, natural resource and manufacturing dependencies, and social fault lines vulnerable to disinformation, these countries appear intent on pushing the current world order to a breaking point. Their actions may not yet be synchronized in time and space, but they appear united on intent and are similar in tactics. This is most obvious in Ukraine, where the Russian war of aggression is being sustained in significant ways with material support from China, Iran, and North Korea.[12] There is also considerable alignment of public messaging, including disinformation.[13] Likewise, China, Russia, and Iran’s approaches toward the countries of the so-called Global South bear significant similarities: manipulating anti-colonial sentiments, criticizing democracy as inferior to the authoritarian model of government, and leveraging the host-nation’s economic and governmental vulnerabilities to gain a tactical foothold and parlay it into strategic influence.
Why We Need a New Vision for Competitiveness
The geopolitical and technological imperatives of the emerging international landscape demand a grand strategy, one that harnesses the transformative potential of AI and other emerging technologies. We must prepare, invest, and organize for the arrival of increasingly powerful AI, including Artificial General Intelligence, while being mindful that its exact definition is evolving alongside the maturation of AI capabilities. The United States’ current leadership in generative AI and AI-related technologies is commendable, but by no means guarantees an enduring advantage. Other nations recognize the transformative potential of AGI for national security, economic prosperity, and global influence, and will undoubtedly strive to be the first to achieve it. The United States must also mobilize, along with our allies and partners, against the sustained attacks against the world order. Managing crises is no longer sufficient, and the constant red-teaming of risks of escalation is counterproductive. To face the present challenge head-on, we must renew our strategic confidence and competence.
This Vision for Competitiveness is our proposed strategy on how to do that in concert with our allies. It seeks to bolster national strength, strengthen alliances, rebuild deterrence, catalyze American prosperity, and ensure our leadership in the coming era of AI-driven technological innovation. Success between 2025 and 2030 is critical; only a decisive strategy can seize the moment and rejuvenate confidence in our institutions, fortify global leadership, and secure national interests for decades to come.
Our nation and its citizens are confronted with critical challenges that have the potential to irreversibly shape the future of not just our country, but civilization as a whole. These issues are pressing and demand immediate attention. It is imperative that we muster the courage and resolve to make novel and consequential decisions that will determine the fate of our nation and the free world.
Purpose of the Document
- To identify the primary challenges and opportunities confronting the United States and the rapidly evolving global order within the next five years, driven by advancements in AI and other emerging technologies, and intensifying geopolitical threats.
- To articulate the fundamental goals that should guide a bipartisan response to these complex challenges, ensuring continued leadership in AI and emerging technologies while navigating their transformative impact on national security, economic competitiveness, and global affairs.
- To put forth a conceptual foundation and guiding objectives for the development of effective national policies, strategic decisions, and investments in AI and emerging technologies that will ensure victory in an evolving, technology-driven geopolitical landscape.
While the purpose of this Vision for Competitiveness is ambitious, this document is not intended as an all-encompassing grand strategy that sets forth overarching U.S. national objectives and how to orchestrate all means of national power. Rather, it is a technology-first vision for how the United States, working with Allies and partners, can master the next wave of innovations, prevail in the existential competition with China and the other members of the Axis of Disruptors, and secure the future.
[1] Mid-Decade Challenges to National Competitiveness, Special Competitive Studies Project (2022).
[2] James Pomfret, et al., China’s Xi Jinping Summons ‘New Productive Forces’, But Old Questions Linger, Reuters (2024).
[3] How Xi Jinping Plans to Overtake America, The Economist (2024).
[4] Emily Feng, Concerns Grow as Post-COVID Economic Recovery in China Flounders, NPR (2023).
[5] Cao Li, China’s Real-Estate Market Just Set a Record—but Not a Good One, Wall Street Journal (2024).
[6] China’s Demographic Outlook and Implications for 2035, Economist Intelligence Unit (2024).
[7] Ellen Zhang & Marius Zaharia, Chinese Graduates Hold Off Career Dreams, Take Temporary Government Jobs, Reuters (2023).
[8] See, e.g., Britt Clennett & Joyce Huang, China ‘Ready to Fight’ After 3 days of Large-Scale Military Drills Around Taiwan, ABC News (2023).
[9] Nick Danby, China’s False Promise: Gunboat Diplomacy, Not Win-Win Outcomes, Will Shape the South China Sea, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (2022).
[10] Hudson Lockett & Joseph Cotterill, ‘Uninvestable’: China’s $2tn Stock Rout Leaves Investors Scarred, Financial Times (2024).
[11] Steve Gutterman, How The Kremlin Stands To Gain From Iran’s Attack On Israel – Analysis, Eurasia Review (2024).
[12] Aamer Madhani, U.S. Intelligence Shows China Is Surging Equipment Sales to Russia to Help War Effort in Ukraine, AP Says, PBS NewsHour (2024); Angelo Amante, G7 Warns Iran Not to Give Russia Ballistic Missiles for Ukraine War, Reuters (2024); Christy Lee, North Korean Missiles Used by Russia Against Ukraine Are Products of Sanction Loopholes, Voice of America (2024).
[13] How China and Russia Use Information Operations to Compete with the US, CNA (2023); Steven Lee Meyers & Sheera Frenkel, In a Worldwide War of Words, Russia, China and Iran Back Hamas, New York Times (2023).